The United States insertion in the world economy and the North American free trade area by Rodríguez Prada, Gonzalo
THE UNITED STATES INSERTION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
AND THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE ÁREA 
GONZALO R O D R Í G U E Z P R A D A 
Universidad de Alcalá de Henares 
(Resumen) 
En este ensayo se analizan los orígenes, el desarrollo y el impacto económico 
del Acuerdo de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (NAFTA) sobre las economías 
de los países que integran este bloque regional. Se presta especial atención al estudio 
de los efectos del tratado de libre comercio sobre la economía de la región fronteriza 
entre México y Estados Unidos -fundamentalmente sobre el sector de maquiladoras-, 
y al análisis de sus consecuencias medioambientales. El estudio presenta al NAFTA 
como una pieza clave en la estrategia de inserción de la economía de Estados Unidos 
en la economía mundial, y muestra que la expansión del comercio y de la inversión 
generados por la apertura comercial traerá consigo significativas ganancias de bienestar 
para el conjunto del bloque regional. Sin embargo, la distribución de estas ganancias de 
bienestar entre las distintas regiones y sectores económicos será muy desigual si no se 
arbitran las políticas correctoras adecuadas. 
Intmducúon 
For much of this century international trade of goods and services -the sum of 
imports and exports- was less than 10 per cent of US gross domestic product (GDP). 
Only twenty years ago the US economy could be adequately characterized as an almost 
closed economy. But in the last two decades that figure grew closer to 20 per cent of 
GDP. In the 1980s the sum of exported and imported goods rose from 55 per cent of US 
manufacturing output to 82 per cent. However, even with a more integrated world 
economy than ever before, about 87 per cent of the goods and services consumed in the 
US are still produced domestically. The progressive US insertion in the world economy 
meant that imports began to displace low-skilled workers or depress their wages in labor-
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intensive industries such as textile, electronics and auto parts. 
During the 1980s an average of 350,000 less skilled immigrants entered the US 
each year. The dollar suffered a strong real appreciation during the first half of the 
decade, following the Reaganomics policy mix of fiscal expansión and monetary 
contraction, and the soaring imports eliminated factory jobs.' The factory workers 
displaced by trade were competing in service industries. The real wage and benefits of 
US factory workers fell 6 per cent, and Germany factory compensation surpassed US 
levéis, after inflation and exchetnge rate adjustments, for the ñrst time in recent history. 
In vcíany other European countries and Japan factory pay also grew above the US 
average. The potential losers from more free trade in the US scene are the 64 million 
workers who never went beyond high school. Since 1979, real wages for high school 
dropouts have fallen by 20 per cent. By contrast, free trade has benefitted the 54 million 
workers who finished college. Their real income grew by 8 per cent during that time. 
Thus, it seems that the US is developing a pattern of income inequality caused, at least 
in part, by the current pattern of trade liberalization. 
In 1986 the US had a current-account déficit of 3.5 per cent of GDP. By 1991 
the déficit was almost back in balance. But by 1992 the trade déficit soared again, 
jumping to an annual rate of about $90 billion, up from $65 billion for 1991. The main 
reason was a 10 per cent increase in imports in 1992, following an increase of less than 
3 per cent in the five previous years. The implied current-account déficit widen again last 
year to around 1 per cent of GDP. 
In this context the emergence of a North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) has been seen for some observers as an accord that is more likely to harm 
than help the overwhelming majority of workers in the US economy.^  The main concern 
' After adjusting for changes in family size, the reíd income before taxes of the 
average family in the top 10 % of the population rose by 21 % from 1979 to 1987, while 
that of the bottom 10 % fell by 12 %. The fraction of U.S. citizens who are "rich", in 
terms of a constant standard, nearly doubled in that period, even while the fraction of 
families defined by the U.S. government as living in poverty simultaneously increased by 
15 %. According to Krugman (1990) "one sees a picture of simultaneous growth in 
wealth and poverty unprecedented in the twentieth century," 20. 
^ See, for example, Koechlin and Larudee (1992). Slow productivity growth is, 
however, the single most important factor affecting the U.S. economy. However, as 
Krugman (1990) puts it, this "is not a policy issue, because we are not going to do 
anything about it," 17. 
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is that more free trade would cost less-skilled jobs in the near future. Other analysts have 
pointed out that the treaty is too much silent on the critical issues of labor standards, 
workers' rights and environmental, health and safety stipulations. On this view the Bush-
Salinas blueprint for economic integration promotes social dumping? US multinationals 
would transfer operations to México not only to benefit from low wages, but to make 
additional savings by avoiding the cost of complying whit US environmental, health and 
safety regulations. Echoing these fears, President CUnton promised during the electoral 
campaign to revisit NAFTA, armed with new legislation (supplemeníal agreements) 
intended to appease the environmentalists, labor unions and black interest groups that 
conform the anti-NAFTA coalition. 
On the next sections I will consider the génesis, rationale and costs and benefits 
implied by NAFTA for the economies of the three nations signatories of this decisive 
free trade agreement. The impact of NAFTA on the maquiladora system and on the 
economies of the Mexican-American border región, and the environmental consequences 
of NAFTA will d\%o be addressed. I arrive to the conclusión that the expansión of trade 
and investment flows will bring meaningful welfare increases for the countries members 
of NAFTA, but these gains will continué to be very unequally distributed. 
The génesis af NAFTA 
The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) signed by both countries on 
January Ist, 1989, represents the first step towards the creation of a continental common 
market in America. The CUFTA main aims were to foster the International goods and 
commercial services trade and to spur investment flows by removing tariffs and non tariff 
barriers between the two countries. The agreement brought about an immediate 15 per 
cent tariff reduction on all traded goods. The CUFTA established a ten year phaseout 
of all trade barriers -with the solé exception of those barriers aimed to protect the 
cultural sector-, instituted a mechanism to settle trade disputes, and promoted a policy 
oínational treatment for commercial services. This last procedure ensures that companies 
in over 150 service sectors can provide their services in the partner country without 
discrimination by eüminating existing federal and local regulations restricting partner 
country access to national markets. 
Canadá and the US form a natural regional economic zone, as the Table 1 
See Friedman (1992), on this issue. 
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shows: the US does more than 5 times more trade with Canadá than is suggested by 
Canada's share of world output (excluding the US), and Canadá does almost 3 times 
more trade with the US than is imphed by the US' share of world output. However, the 
ratio of US (or Canadá) share of trade to the rest of American countries share of world 
output is much lower. 
One step further in the process of regional integration in America was the 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiaíive, formulated by President Bush on June 27, 1990. 
This glamorous project is a global proposal intended to extend trade liberalization to a 
widening circle of Latin American countries, from Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego. This 
free trade crusade does not stop in international trade issues, covering also foreign debt, 
ñnancing and investment topics. Once Latin America has at last understood that it needs 
to open up, towards the end of this century the American countries ought to start 
building a single market for the benefit of them all. The process of decentralization, 
deregulation and competition brought about for the economic liberalization programs will 
nurture the process of economic reforms and enable the development of an equally 
competitive political system in the Americas. 
In this context, the Mexican government made it clear, in March 1990, that his 
country would move quickly toward the objective of a free trade association with Canadá 
and the US. The reasons for this move on the Mexican side were two-folded. First, 
México is the US' third-largest trading partner. Second, the stabilization program under 
way of the Mexican economy required an opening up to international trade in order to 
attract foreign capital flows to sustain investment and promote growth. México suffered 
at the time rampant inflation, an overwhelming national debt, and it had been cut out 
of the world capital markets. As a result, this country had been unable to invest as much 
as it should to facilítate the continuation of the program of economic and political 
reforms. Table 2 shows the basic indicators of the three economies just before the 
beginning of negotiations. And Table 3 shows the intra-region trade at the start of the 
process of economic integration. 
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TABLE 1 
RATIO OF SHARE OF TRADE TO PARTNER'S SHARE OF WORLDOUTPUT 
Trxkr 
US 
CANADÁ 
OTHER AMERICAN 
JAPAN 
E.C. 
US 
2.9 
1.5 
1.1 
OJ 
CANADÁ 
5.2 
0.6 
0.9 
03 
OTHER AMERICAN 
IJ 
0.4 
2.0 
0.5 
OJ 
JAPAN 
1.1 
0.6 
0.6 
E.C. 
0.6 
0.4 
0.8 
OS 
2S 
SOURCE: Lawrence Summers data for 1989, quoted by 
The Economist (August 31st 1991). 
TABLE 2 
NORTH AMERICAN BASIC STATISTICS IN 1990 
CANADÁ 
US 
MÉXICO 
NAFTA 
POPULATION 
(milliODS) 
26.6 
250.0 
82.1 
358.7 
ÁREA 
(million Km ) 
9,976 
9373 
1,958 
21307 
GDP 
(SbüUon) 
572 
5Í14 
241 
6327 
GDP per capí» 
(S) 
21427 
22,055 
2,935 
17,639 
SOURCE: World Bank {World Development Repon). 
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TABLE3 
INTRA-NORTH AMERICAN TRADE IN 1990 
from/to 
CANADÁ 
US 
MÉXICO 
NAFTA 
to/from 
CANADÁ 
US 
MÉXICO 
NAFTA 
(in percentaje of total exports) 
CANADÁ 
-
21.1 
2.4 
15.1 
US 
72.7 
-
73.1 
21.2 
MÉXICO 
0.4 
7.2 
-
5.2 
(in percenlage of total imports) 
CANADÁ 
-
18.1 
1.3 
14.1 
US 
62.9 
-
72.0 
14.7 
MÉXICO 
1.2 
6.0 
-
4.8 
NAFTA 
73.1 
28.3 
75.5 
413 
NAFTA 
64.1 
28.3 
73.3 
33.6 
SOURCE: CEDEAL (1993). 
In 1987 the US- México Framework Agreement set up a bilateral forum to 
address trade disputes. In May 1989 México announced widespread revisions of 
regulations governing foreign investment. During 1990 México and the US began 
discussing a free trade deal.* From Mexico's point of view, such agreement would give 
* The first round of negotiations was held in Toronto (Canadá), be^nning in June 
12,1991. Arriving to the final agreement required six more rounds, held in the foUowing 
places and dates: Seattle (U.S.), in August 18-20,1991; Zacatecas (México), in October 
26-27, 1991; Chantilly (U.S.), in February 9-10, 1992; Montreal (Canadá), in April 6-8, 
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credibility and raise confidence in the recent reforms, preserving the economic stability 
that Meneo was working so hard to build. This could help to restore the flow of ñnance 
towards the Mexican economy, allowing the country to ñnance the excess of investment 
over national saving by running a current-account déficit. In the end this process of 
economic reforms would yield also political benefits, securing long-term political stability. 
On February 5th, 1991, Canadá, US and México smnounced the beginning of 
negotiations on a North American Free Trade Agreement. President Bush asked 
Congress to extend the fast track procedures for approval of trade agreements for two 
years, in order to have time to negotiate NAFTA, conclude the Uruguay Round, and 
develop the first stages of the Enterprise for the Ameñcas Initiative? On August 12th, 
1992, it was announced that the three countries had completed the negotiations for the 
creation of a continental market. Finally, on September 14th, 1993 the side-accords on 
labor, the environment and import surges were signed. The next step is to develop and 
submit to nationed parliaments enabling legislation that will activate the trade agreement. 
If the process conducting to fuU implementation of the treaty is successful, despite the 
substantial political resistances at work, the NAFTA agreement will take effect on 
January Ist, 1994. At that time, customs duties on about half of US products will be 
eliminated straightaway. Other tariffs will be reduced to zero from the 10 per cent 
current average, over 10 or 15 years. 
The mtionaie for NAFTA 
NAFTA means a regional trading block with 365 million consumers and a 
combined GDP approaching $6,5 trillion, parallel only to the European Community 
market. This comprehensive agreement is expected to increase competitiveness, reduce 
consumer prices and promote the creation of export-related jobs. Moreover, NAFTA will 
help the partner nations sell more goods and services to each other, facilitating resource 
allocation among sectors, and enabling the combmation of these resources to face 
1992; D.F., México, in July 25-26,1992. The last one took place in Washington, in August 
2-12, 1992. 
' Under/oíí track, Congress approves or disapproves the final text of the agreement 
and its implementing legislation without amendment within 90 working days. In this way 
the fast track process makes it possible to negotiate credibly and undertake solid 
commitments. 
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competition from other countries. In 1991 intra-NAFTA trade was near $245 billion, 
compared with an extra-NAFTA trade of $760 billion. Intra-regional exports in North 
America reached 42 per cent of total exports, a figure that compares favorably with the 
31 per cent attained by the Japan and East Asia trade block, but that remains distant 
from the 71 per cent achieved in the EC and EFTA free trade área. 
NAFTA introduces two additional disciplines not covered by the CUFTA -
protection of intellectual property rights and liberalization of land transportation. Other 
chapters of the CUFTA are however essentially reproduced in NAFTA -including 
provisions to remove barriers to energy trade and to facilítate border-crossing procedures 
for business travel. 
The key elements implied by NAFTA are: 1) a gradual reduction and eventual 
elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers to agricultural and manufacturing trade 
(including reduced motor vehicle and auto parts tariffs, and reduced textiles and apparel 
barriers); 2) a removal of barriers to the flow of services (including financia] services); 
3) a removal of barriers to the flow of investment; and 4) in addition, NAFTA is the first 
comprehensive trade agreement in the history of US trade policy that directly deals with 
environmental problems. 
To protect members from unexpected importation surges, NAFTA contains 
temporary safeguard clauses. In the case of the fmancial sector, México has asked for 
temporary protection for its newly privatized banking industry, limiting the number of 
US and Canadian banks that could opérate in México and the kind of producís that 
foreign banks could offer. And to guarantee that the free trade agreement advantages 
apply only to goods and services domestically produced, NAFTA incorporales regional 
contení or rules of origin st2mdards to be satisfied by all producís subjecl to preferential 
tariff benefils. The final agreement establishes that the regional valué added of motor 
vehicles should initially be at leasl 50 per cent and then increase gradually, for a period 
of eight years unlil it reaches 62,5 per cent. 
A distinclive aspecl of NAFTA is that it involves a core agreement among 
Canadá, US and México that covers fee trade in goods, services, investment flows and 
dispute setllemenl. This core agreement is complemenled by arrangements designed to 
accommodale the special needs of each participant. This approach, faithful lo the spirit 
of the Enterprise for the Americas Jnitiative, will permit to extend the free trade 
agreement to other nations so long as they are willing to submit lo the provisions 
conlained in the core plan. Negolialions have already begun involving other Latín 
American countries, particularly Chile and the Mercosur group (headed by Argentina 
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and Brazil). 
But what makes NAFTA singular, compared to other free trade áreas, are the 
great differences among the pjirticipants. Actually, NAFTA is an arrangement between 
two highly advanced industrial countries and one relatively much less developed country. 
Mexican economy is only 5 per cent the size of the US', In 1990, the US' per capita 
income was $22,055, for only $2,935 in Mexico's case (well below the $3,500 obtained in 
1981).* Mexican productivity is one fifth of the productivity of the US and Canadá - and 
its expenditures on education and R & D are weak. This gap reflects differences in 
technological development, infrastructure, and capital and resources availability. In part 
because of these differences, the impact of NAFTA on different sectors, groups and 
industries will vary, at least in the short term. 
Table 4 shows the evolution of the relative factor contení of industrial exports 
in each country. The evidence is consistent with the expansión of both inter-industry and 
intra-industry trade among the North American nations. The comparative advantage 
theory of international trade assesses that, to compete, countries must specialize where 
they have a relative edge. If goods trade freely, the prices of similar goods will equalize, 
and so will factor prices, even in absence of international mobility of labor and capital. 
Under the free trade agreement the low-wage México will tend to make labor-intensive 
goods, while their capital-abundant neighbors will specialize in technology-intensive 
products. Therefore, US and Canadá low-skilled workers should flow overseas, or wages 
of low-skilled workers must fall. 
* However, if purchasing power parities -which take account of international 
differences in prices- were used to convert the local-currency GDPs into dollars (instead 
of using market exchange rates), Mexico's GDP would experience a sharp jump ($590 
billion in 1992), surpassing Canadá. In this case mexican GDP per head would grow to 
$6,590 in 1992 (from $3,700 using market exchange rates). 
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TABLE4 
FACTOR CONTENT OF NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL EXFORTS 
(in percentaje) 
CANADÁ 
Natuinl retourcet 
Low-ikilled labor 
Technolojy 
High-riúUed labor 
US 
Natural reaources 
Low-tkilled labor 
Technology 
Hifh-dúlled labor 
MÉXICO 
Natural reaounxf 
Low-ikilled labor 
Technok>ty 
High-dullcd labor 
1M*-7I 
33.0 
2.4 
19.2 
45.4 
15.9 
5.0 
51.0 
2g.l 
52.7 
lOJ 
22.2 
14.9 
l»7«-7i 
31.2 
2.0 
20.2 
46.6 
14.2 
5.6 
51.7 
283 
43J 
143 
21S 
20.6 
1*M 
223 
2.8 
21.1 
53J 
13.0 
3.9 
56.6 
26.5 
19.8 
9.8 
43.4 
27.0 
UM 
24.7 
3.1 
23.1 
49.1 
143 
4 3 
54.2 
27J 
25.0 
8.1 
35.2 
31.7 
SOURCE: J. BerUnski (1992). 
Anti-NAFTA circles, led by US labor groups, have expressed their opposítion 
to the treaty, fearing the potential loss of jobs induced by the vast wage differences 
between US and Menean workers. 
Intra-industry trade - the cross-flows of similar goods between trade partners -
dees not depend on the differences in factor proportions and, thus, cannot genérate 
changes in income distribution. But US mtra-industry trade is dominated by trade in 
made-to-order intermediate goods that do not form an essential part of major current 
exports of developing countries. However, leading áreas of the Mexican exports to the 
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US are made up by producís mcluded in the domain of intra-industry trade, such as 
motor vehicle parts and accessories, petroleum refining, radio, televisión, and audio and 
video equipment. This intra-industry trade between the US and México primarily involves 
intermediate goods that are produced in large plants using labor-intensive techniques. To 
the extent that the industrialized countries aic reducing selectively the protection on 
intra-industry trade, whereas other trade is being undercut by trade restrictions, the trade 
Uberalizing effects of intra-industry trade are not likely to redress the current bias in 
protection in the US against manufactured exports from developing countriesJ This 
makes NAFTA especially advantageous for a country Uke México, that will enjoy a 
privileged access to the US and Canadian markets, despite current biases in US 
protection. 
Aside from income distribution effects, the trade liberalization package could 
entail a better allocation of resources. The efficiency gains from the internal maiket can 
be considered equivalent to shifting the production function upwards. Thus, the marginal 
productivity of capital will increase at any given capital stock. This implies that firms will 
increase their capital stock until the marginal efficiency of capital had returned to the 
opportunity cost of capital. This change in the capital stock will lead, in turn, to an 
increase in output in the medium-run. The general-equilibrium models that assume 
constant returns to scale and product differentiation show that the welfare gains for the 
Mexican economy of more trade liberalization between México and the US will be 
modest.* 
This medium-run growth bonus delivered by NAFTA does not transíate itself into 
an increase in the long-run or steady-state growth path, under constant returns to scale. 
But it has long been recognized that the assumption of constant returns to scale was not 
satisfactory since it could not explain continuing economic growth, except by introducing 
exogenous technological progress. Thus, to expledn endogenous economic growth we must 
' Expanding intra-industry could contribute to, rather than reduce, the current bias 
in U.S. exports against manufactured exports from developing countries. Therefore, 
further intra-industry trade liberalization among the industrial nations may well reduce 
export opportunities for manufactured goods exports from developing coimtries. See on 
this, Ray (1991). 
* These gains will amount to less than 2 per cent of gross national product when the 
tariffs are eliminated. With increasing returns the welfare gains are substantially larger. 
A summary of the results of recent empirical studies is provided in Waverman (1993). 
See also Lustig et. al. (1992) and O'Driscoll (1993). 
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consider increasing returns to scale. These new growth models' come to the conclusión 
that the static efficiency gains from the internal market could permanently increase the 
regional trading block growth rate. According to a recent study by the US International 
Trade Commission, NAFTA will increase US real gross domestic product up to 0.5 per 
cent per year once it is fully implemented. The welfare gains for México could be much 
larger. 
The costs and benefits af NAFTA 
The appeal of NAFTA from the US side comes from the fact that Canadá and 
México are the US' first and third export markets, respectively. México is also the US' 
largest manufactured goods market. Thus, the enhancing of trade relationships with such 
important partners is vital to spur US competitiveness, economic growth and job creation 
dependent on exports - which essentially means jobs in the production of machine tools 
and auto parts, textile fabrics, and medical equipment. 
The gains from NAFTA for the US and Canadá will stem not only from higher 
exports in response to expanded capital investment and consumption in México, but also 
from an increase in low-priced Mexican imports. Besides, México is a growing market 
for trade and investment - the Mexican population, now one third of that of the US will 
reach 100 million by the year 2,000. Capital-intensive and technology-intensive sectors will 
get gains from increasing Mexican demand for such goods. And labor-intensive sectors 
could suffer some production loss because of Mexican competition. In addition, the US 
hopes that NAFTA will contribute to curb the tide of Mexican migrants heading north 
by stimulating market-led growth in México. 
Canadá participation in NAFTA is also explained by the fact that an agreement 
limited to the US and México could undermine Canada's ability to attract foreign 
investment in the near future. The potential impact of NAFTA on the Mexican economy 
will depend essentially of the extent of foreign direct investment and related technology 
transfers. Mexico's workforce is expanding by 3 per cent a year, and this means that it 
has to grow at a sustained rate of 5-6 per cent, to créate the 1,2 million jobs each year 
' A survey of this approach is provided by P. Romer, "Increasing returns and new 
developments in the theory of growing," NBER Working Paper, N** 3098 (September, 
1989). 
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required to avoid an increasing rate of unemployment.'" To achieve this goal, México 
needs to supplement a scanty savings rate of 19 per cent of GDP with foreign investment. 
And recent history shows that sufficient capital flows for México come mainly from the 
US." 
Bilateral trade between México and the US has grown rapidly in the last few 
years (from $21 billion in 1987 to $62 biUion in 1991). About 80 per cent of Mexico's 
trade takes place with the US. In 1991 Mexico's imports from the US reach $33.3 billion 
(12 per cent of Mexico's GDP); meanwhile its exports to the US carne to $29 billion 
(10.5 per cent of GDP). Mexico's current account déficit ($20 billion in 1992, about 6.3 
per cent of GDP) is now the biggest challenge for the Mexican economy. The US exports 
to México doubled in the past four years, to a projected $41 billion in 1992. 
This path reflects in part the Mexican efforts to modernize its industrial base by 
importing capital equipment. Nevertheless, this huge current-account déficit puts pressure 
on the currency and it could forcé a devaluation of the Mexican peso. This, in turn, could 
endanger the successful Mexican economic stabilization program. The rate of infiation 
was 12 per cent in 1992, from a peak of 159 per cent in 1987; and the government run 
a surplus of about 1 per cent of GDP in 1992 - exduding money raised from privatization 
measures -, from a record déficit of 16 per cent of GDP in 1987. Devaluation fears will 
decrease if these three things happen: a) future capital inflows are of a long term nature 
rather than volatUe speculative movements; b) productivity increases are large enough 
to offset real appreciation; and c) NAFTA is ratified in due time - because it will provide 
the regulatory framework necessary to convince foreign investors that the liberal 
economic reforms, that began in 1986 with Mexico's entry into the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), will not be reversed. In this sense, NAFTA is a natural 
step forward in the liberalization process of the Mexican economy. 
NAFTA will convert México in an entry point into the large North American 
"" With the exception of the lost decade of the 1980s (where the economy did not 
grow at all, manufacturing real wages diminish by 31 per cent, and the infiation rate 
averaged nearly 100 per cent), Mexico's real GDP rate of growth has been remarkable, 
averaging 6.6 per cent (3.4 per cent, in per capita terms) between 1950 and 1981. See 
IMF Survey (December 4,1992) and J. Kolbe, "US-Mexico Relations: Building a Golden 
Age," Economic Development Review, Vol. 6, N» 3 (Fall, 1988). 
" Direct foreign investment in México during the period 1989-1992 totaled a record 
$25 billion (67 per cent of this figure went into manufacturing activities and 20 % into 
tourism). The US accounts for 65 per cent, the EC 25 per cent, and Japan 5 per cent. 
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míirket. US' investors will find less costly to produce there than in Korea or TaiwcUi. 
Thus, foreign direct investment that would otherwise have gene to East Asian countries 
will be diverted to México. It has been estimated that, assuming capital inflows to México 
ranging from $1.5 billion in 1992 to about $5 billions ¡n 2001, Mexico's growth rate would 
be 13 or 14 per cent higher than it would have been in the absence of NAFTA.'^ 
The problem with a regional free trade área -like NAFTA- is that it can only 
improve global welfare if the amount of trade it creates exceeds the amount it diverts. 
However, in the case of NAFTA trade creation will likely exceed trade diversión, because 
this particular trading block is formed by neighbors who already have significant trade 
with one another (see Tables 1 and 3). Relative little trade will be diverted and benefits 
from economies of scale will be large." 
The Mexican-American horder regfon and the maquiladora system 
The Mexican-American border región holds around 13 million people living 
within 80 km. of the 3,200-km. border that stretches from the sister cities of San Diego-
Tijuana, verging on the Pacific Ocean, to Brownsville-Matamoros, on the Gulf of México, 
going trough Nogales (Arizona)-Nogales (Sonora), El Paso-Ciudad Juárez, and Laredo-
Nuevo Laredo. These Mexican-American neighbor cities cíui be called "sisters", but they 
are no "twins". Although about three-quarters of all family incomes along the border are 
below the official US' poverty Une, average income on the Mexican side (that suffers 
from high rates of labor turnover) is less than half - and sometimes much less - the 
average income across the border, bearing a 16 per cent unemployment rate (8 per cent 
'^  See IMF Survey (January 25, 1993); and L. Rubino, "The Rationale for NAFTA: 
Mexico's New 'Outward-Looking' Strategy". Business Economies, Vol. 27, N^ 2, (April, 
1992). 
" Assume that the U.S. originally imported a traded good from Taiwan, which 
produces that good more cheaply than any of the NAFTA countries. Then, the increased 
trade between partners would had been at the expense of more efficient trade with 
Taiwan. Comparative advantage is denied, and global welfare would suffer. As a rule, the 
larger the initial trade flows between partners, the higher tariffs were before the 
formation of the free trade área, and the lower the external tariffs afterwards, the more 
likely is that NAFTA will créate more trade than it diverts. However, the intra-NAFTA 
trade is still well below the intra-European Community trade (that exceeds 60 per cent 
of total trade). 
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on the US side). The environmental conditions are also very different on each border 
side. 
Mexico's importance to the US is shown by the maquiladora system - offshore 
production in México. The maquiladora program was begim in 1%5. Under this 
industrial structure US-made components are imported by México, tax free, for assembly 
and immediate re-export to the US, duty free except on the valué added in México. 
Maquila trade represents a net import for the US, since the raw materials and 
components exported to México for processing are worth less than the imported fmished 
products. The cheap and abundant labor supply along the US-Mexican border is, of 
course, the main reason for the maquiladoras success. Average labor costs per worker-
hour in 1992 were $2.05 in the maquiladoras, about 40 per cent of those in the US. This 
has risen concerns on the effect of maquiladoras on US low-skilled jobs. But in a world 
were competitiveness depends on just-in time inventory control techniques, teamwork 
systems, and quality management providing high quality and a short time to market, 
cheap labor is not everything, and there is a limit to the incentives to move jobs to low-
cost countries like México. 
Despite these fears, the maquiladora program has contributed to revitahze the 
Mexican-American border región. It has been estimated that the elimination of the 
maquiladora system would result in the permanent loss of almost 100,000 US jobs by 
1994. For every plant on the Mexican side, there is usually a warehousing activity on the 
US side. Mexican workers spend 40 to 60 per cent of all wages earned at the 
maquiladoras on the American side. And just 2 per cent of thp materials used by the 
maquiladoras come from México.'^  
Maquiladoras account for only 8 per cent of total foreign direct investment in 
México. However, the more than 1,700 maquilas along the border provide over 500,000 
jobs to the depressed Mexican labor market. Second-generation maquilas, where more 
reliance is put on skilled design and manufacturing than on basic assembly, not only will 
provide more jobs, but also will become in the near future a source of technology for the 
Mexican economy. The new foreign investment will not be going mainly, as it has 
happened so far, into poUuting sweatshops on the Mexican-US border. 
The auto irdustry has already become an important example of industrial 
integration between México and the US México has a large dependence on imports of 
US components (primarily, engines and other technology-intensive products) for its 
" See 77ie Economist (December 12, 1992) 25-27. 
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growing domestic market as well as for automobile exports. And the US imports from 
México labor-intensive producís (including car seats, ignition wiring, wind-shield wipers, 
and seat belts). In turn, as Canadá did in the síxties, México will offer the opportunity 
for the creation of a large new automobile market in the US backyard. México now 
wants to encourage the domestic manufacture of components that are currently imported 
in the country for use in maquiladora plants. 
The effect of NAFTA on the economic future of the border región is unclear. 
One basic motive for Mexico's interest in NAFTA is to spread more widely the economic 
growth that has been taking place along the border. Even after the liberalization of trade, 
the border área could remain an attractive site to companies interested in iocating their 
labor-intensive processes on the Mexican side, and the capital-intensive ones on the US 
side, because, despite the trend towards the equalization of wages brought about by 
NAFTA, this event will only take place in the long run. 
However, the Mexican border región has some comparative disadvantages with 
other southern áreas (like the Monterrey región): it lacks infrastructure (an inevitable 
consequence of the inability to set corporate taxes on the maquilas) as well as a native 
industrial, ñnancial and educational system. Therefore, it will be needed a huge effort 
to secure the economic potential of the border región after NAFTA. The most likely 
result is that NAFTA will increase the geographical diversification of Mexico's 
manufacturing base, by spreading foreign investment away from the border áreas. 
The envimnmentai impact cf NAFTA 
Another big difference between the sister cities along the border is that, whereas 
the northern ones are relatively unpoUuted (possessing proper waste-water treatment and 
safe drainage), their southern neighbors do not have the adequate controls and technical 
means to avoid the indiscriminate reléase of solvents into the atmosphere, ñor to avoid 
dumping of raw sewage into the border rivers. Besides, although the maquiladora 
program rules that the worst wastes have to be shipped back to the US, in practice the 
waste is stored or burned on site, and dumped ülegally. 
Adding to this, many environmentalists have argued that NAFTA would expand 
economic activity, which would lead to more pollution. The idea that the own economic 
success of NAFTA would induce more environmental degradation has been recently 
challenged by Grossman and Krueger (1992). These economists argüe that NAFTA will 
raise Mexican incomes. In turn, the added GDP growth in México will induce a greater 
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demand for a cleaner environment in México." Freer trade will permit México to 
produce goods in which it has a comparative advantage, like agricultural goods and more 
labor-intensive manufactured goods, both of which are "cleaner" than the average. And 
it will entail a substantial cut in the production of goods that genérate larger amounts 
of toxic waste per unit of output (like chemical, rubber and plástic products). 
The study by Grossman and Krueger also highlights the fact that the poUution 
abatetnent costs for the average US manufacturing industry are only 1.4 per cent of valué 
added, casting doubt on the environmentaüsts' claim that US and Canadian high-
poUuting companies could obtain important gains from moving to the less heavily 
regulated México. The essential factor in determining US-Mexican trade and plant 
location is the cost of unskilled-labor. The differences in the costs of pollution control 
explain very little of the changes in current bilateral trade, adding nothing to explaining 
the maquiladora system localization and production patterns. 
The potential environment impact of NAFTA has occupied, at times, the center 
stage in the debate concerning the costs and benefits delivered by the treaty. Among the 
environmental provisions of NAFTA are: 1) prospective investors must submit 
environmental impact studies, and must comply with the environmental standards on new 
investments; 2) the environmental laws apply equally to domestic and foreign investors; 
3) NAFTA countries will cooperate to enhance the protection of health and the 
environment; and 4) México will refuse entry to investments or manufacturing processes 
rejected by the US and Canadá as ecologically harmful, and will accept only productive 
activities that maintain the environment and the quahty of air and water. 
To clean the poor record of México on environmental protection, the Mexican 
government has recently undertaken a domestic environmental policy campaign, directed 
to appease the fears of US Congress and US en\áronmentalists. Among these measures 
stand out the permanent closure of more than 100 companies (including the recent 
closure of the Azcapotzalco Refinery) and the temporary shut down of more than 1,500 
other large and medium-size companies that were major sources of air pollution 
emissions, the reduction of the lead content of gasoUne, and the development of a 
General Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection Law. 
The cooperation efforts between México and the US have recently been 
" Grossman and Krueger (1992) show that the turning point in the reiationship 
between pollution and per capita GDP comes at about $5,000 (for incomes that exceed 
$5,000 pollution actually falls as per capita income rises). 
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reflected in the creation of a binational commission to clean up the Gulf of México, and 
by the development of an Integrated Border Plan, announced in February 1992, to 
improve environmentiil conditions and infrastructure along the shared border. So far 
México has poured more than $500 million into this program. In June, 1993, the Mexican 
government announced that the expenditure for environmental protection had soared to 
1 per cent of GNP. 
Condudmg renuaks 
A trilátera! NAFTA aiding liberalization of the Mexican economy will improve 
economic growth and raise real income, benefiting all the countries directly implicated 
in the treaty. In addition to this, NAFTA will institutionalize the economic reforms 
carried over by the Mexican government, cutting down foreign investors fears on the 
future of these reforms. México has experienced in the last few years an enormous 
transformation, liberalizing the economy by eliminating a great number of command-
economy controls, and by privatizing several important sectors (from the banking industry 
and the agriculture to the telephone company). The long-run credibility of these reforms 
will be enhanced by NAFTA. 
In addition, the NAFTA success would mean a big step forward for the 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, opening the door in the near future to other Latin 
American countries for joining the free trade área. But for a successful knocking on 
NAFTA's doors, these countries must strengthen, in the first place, the liberalization and 
macroeconomic stabilization of their economies. Chile and the MERCOSUR group are 
already queuing to join NAFTA, and there is a serious competition to be first in the 
waiting list.'* 
As regards the regional distribution impact of NAFTA, there are no a priori 
grounds for predicting the pattern of relative gains and losses. There are risks and 
opportunities of different types affecting regions, and the costs of absorbing country-
specifíc economic shocks will be minimized if labor costs adjust relatively flexibly. The 
geographical diversifícation of Mexico's industrial structure will be promoted by the 
'* In June 19, 1991, and under the auspices of the Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative, the MERCOSUR group and the U.S. signed the so called "4+1 Agreement". 
This agreement is the fírst step towards the insertion of the Latin American trade block 
in the hemispheric free trade íu'ea proposed by the Initiative. 
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completion of an ambítious infrastructure program. And the wage losses suffered by US 
workers in labor-intensive sectors will require more money spent on employee training. 
Slashing wages and transferring production to México in order to cut costs, can only be 
a short term solution for US and Canadian companies. 
Investing in worker treiining and education is the one assured trail to achieve 
higher productivity and to produce high-value-added goods and services. But in order to 
reduce locational disadvantages of the least favored and peripheral regions, it could be 
necessary undertake common policies now missing in NAFTA. As the European 
Community experience has shown, the catch-up process of the least developed countries 
and regions depends critically on securing synergies between national development and 
stabilization efforts and the common poUcies for the single market. 
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